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CAN THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" JUSTIFY NON-CONSENSUAL
SEARCHES OF HOMES IN BANKRUPTCY CASES?
A. Mechele Dickerson'
INTRODUCTION

Everybody seems to enjoy berating people who file for bankruptcy. While the
Enron and WorldCom scandals have somewhat shifted the anti-bankruptcy
animosity from people who file for bankruptcy personally to people who cause
businesses to file, there remains a persistent perception that individuals abuse
bankruptcy laws by running up too much debt, then discharging that debt without
even attempting to repay it. Critics specifically argue that existing bankruptcy laws
make it too easy for people to shield assets from their creditors either by using state
exemption laws to keep valuable property or simply by hiding their assets from
creditors.' For the last five years, Congress has responded to those criticisms by
introducing legislation designed to prevent such abuse.2
Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. I thank Professor Paul Marcus
for inviting me to participate in the Prosecuting White-Collar Crimesymposium presented
by the Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William and Mary School of Law. I am extremely
grateful for comments, suggestions, and insights I received at the conference from Debera
Conlon and Judy Wheat, and from Professors Berie Bell and Dave Moran. Finally, I thank
Professor Marcus and Professor Kathryn Urbonya for comments they made on an earlier
draft of the article. A much earlier version of this paper appears at 10 J. BANKR. L. &PRAC.
*

541 (2001), and in CLE materials available at http://www.abiworld.org/abidata/online/
conference/0 1sebc/Dickerson.html. This project would not have been possible without the
diligent and dedicated research assistance of Brian Holmen, Nikki Humphrey, Angela
Montag, and Nicole Harms. This project was supported, in part, by grants provided by the
William and Mary School of Law.
Kathleen Day, Hill Set to Toughen Bankruptcy Law, EliminatingPersonalDebt Will
Be Harder,WASH. POST, July 26, 2002, at AI; Editorial, Millionaire'sLoophole, WASH.
POST, Apr. 23, 2002, at A 16; Ruth Simon, Bankruptcy Bill WouldMake It Harderto Filefor
Chapter 7, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2002, at D3; Jackie Spinner, Homes Remain Rogue
Executives' Castles Under Loophole, WASH. POST, July 12, 2002, at E3.
2 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 975,108th
Cong. (2003); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R.
333, 107th Cong. (2001); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 2415, 107th Cong. (2000);
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 102 (1999); Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1999, S. 625, 106th Cong. (1999); A Bill to Amend Title 11 of the U.S. Code to
Modify the Application of Chapter 7 Relating to Liquidation Cases, H.R. 333, 106th Cong.
(1999); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 101 (1998); Consumer
Lenders and Borrowers Bankruptcy Accountability Act of 1998, H.R. 3146, 105th Cong. §
8 (1998); Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997, S. 1301, 105th Cong. § 102 (1997);
Responsible Borrower Protection Bankruptcy Act of 1997, H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. § 101
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One debtor's recent attempt to shield assets from his creditors caused a court
to condone the use of a process not typically associated with civil proceedings: a
non-consensual search of the debtor's home.3 Specifically, the court in In re
Barman concluded that the government's interest in ensuring that people comply
with civil bankruptcy laws justified the intrusion into the privacy of a person's
home.4 This Article considers the reasonableness of the search in Barman and
broadly considers whether searches should ever be authorized in civil bankruptcy
proceedings.
Part I generally discusses the constitutional limits of searches. This Part
suggests that, notwithstanding the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement, courts closely scrutinize searches of private homes. This Part further
notes that, even when courts have authorized residential searches based on less than
probable cause, those courts first have determined that a strong governmental
interest justified invading the sanctity of a home.
Part II of the Article discusses the use of search or "inspection" orders in
bankruptcy cases. After briefly summarizing the general duties of debtors and
trustees in Chapter 7 cases, I discuss In re Barman and the Chapter 7 Trustee's
decision in that case to request permission to search all parts of a debtor's home.5
This Part suggests that the Barmancourt's decision to permit a broad search, though
arguably consistent with bankruptcy policy, fails to properly weigh the debtor's
privacy interests in his home. This Part further argues that the search was not
consistent with the Fourth Amendment requirement that warrants specify the
property to be searched and that the Trustee failed to establish that the search was
needed to advance a strong governmental interest. Moreover, I suggest that, even
if there is a public interest in ensuring that debtors fully and fairly participate in
federal bankruptcy proceedings, this interest does not justify allowing private
attorneys to execute search warrants to search a private residence.
The Article concludes by arguing that current law simply does not support a
trustee's request to search a debtor's home. No statute, rule, or regulation gives
courts the authority to issue warrants or orders to search a debtor's home.
Moreover, whereas searches typically are performed by law enforcement officers
or government officials, the Barman court authorized a search that was conducted
by a private attorney.6 I argue that searches might be appropriate if, at the time a
debtor files her bankruptcy petition, she consents to having her home searched.
Likewise, I suggest that searches might be appropriate if the Bankruptcy Code7 is
(1997).
3 See Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
4 See id. at 419.
5 See infra notes 156-172 and accompanying text.
6 See id.
' 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000).
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amended to give courts the explicit authority to authorize trustees to search debtors'
homes.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. In General
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and
seizures by officers acting under a general warrant by providing that warrants
cannot be issued except "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."' The Fourth Amendment is not violated if the affected party (or someone
with common authority over the searched property) voluntarily consents to the
search.9 Absent voluntary consent, however, courts must evaluate the search under
standards of reasonableness and must assess the degree to which the search intrudes
upon a person's privacy and is necessary to promote a legitimate governmental
interest. Moreover, if the search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, courts must
also consider whether it specifies the place to be searched or the thing(s) to be
seized.

°

B. Reasonableness of a Search
Reasonableness is the ultimate standard when applying the Fourth Amendment
to a search." A warrantless search of a home is presumptively unreasonable, and
thus unconstitutional. 2 Indeed, to deter unreasonable intrusions, courts have
' U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he rule of probable
cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been
found for accommodating" the often opposing interests of law enforcement and the citizen's
right of privacy. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
9 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (holding that a warrantless search
is valid if consent is given by a person who has "common authority" over the home).
0 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999) (holding that probable cause to
search a car is sufficient to search containers in the car).
" Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523,539 (1967), cited in Soldal v. Cook County, Ill.,
506 U.S. 56, 71 (1992).
2 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); see also United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984):
At the risk of belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which the
individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not
authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is
prepared to recognize as justifiable. Our cases have not deviated from this basic
Fourth Amendment principle. Searches and seizures inside a home without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances.
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fashioned an "exclusionary rule," under which evidence produced by an illegal
search or seizure cannot be used against a criminal defendant in court to prove her
guilt. 3 The Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule by
creating exceptions to the warrant requirement. Those exceptions include the good
faith exception 4 and exceptions based on exigent circumstances, such as the need
to pursue a fleeing felon, 5 prevent the destruction or removal of evidence, 6 or
conduct a limited search incident to an arrest to protect the arresting officers. "
The Supreme Court has crafted specific limitations to the warrant requirement
for searches that are peripheral to (but not actually inside) the home. For example,
the Court held as constitutional a police request for trash collectors to sift through
trash left in front of a defendant's home because the homeowner had no objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage that was deposited in an area
inspectible by the public and that had been left for strangers to take.' Similarly, the
Court held that police did not need a warrant to fly a helicopter at a low altitude to
observe the interior of a partially-covered greenhouse in the back yard of a private
'3 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643,655 (1961) (holding that "evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a state court"). The exclusionary rule is designed to protect Fourth Amendment rights
before they are violated on the theory that the police will be less likely ex ante to violate a
defendant's rights if they know that evidence seized during an illegal search will be
inadmissible in court. Sharon L. Davies, The Penalty of Exclusion - A Price or Sanction?,
73 S. CAL L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2000).
" This exception provides that, where a neutral judge or magistrate determines that a
home can be searched and issues a warrant, neither the police investigation nor criminal
prosecution should be penalized if the warrant is later found to be invalid. The officers'
action must be objectively reasonable, and they must act in good faith. See United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897,907, 913-14 (1984). This exception assumes that police officers could
not have intended to violate a defendant's constitutional rights if they performed a search or
seized evidence pursuant to the apparently valid warrant. Thus, even if the search is later
determined to be invalid, the evidence obtained in the search will not be excluded from trial
if police officers obtained the warrant from a judge or magistrate. See id. at 922.
'5 See Warren v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
6 For example, the Court in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), held that
police who observed a drug deal, then made a warrantless arrest of one of its participants,
could enter and occupy the defendant's apartment for nineteen hours (while they waited for
a magistrate to issue a search warrant) to prevent the defendant from tampering with
evidence. See id. at 810.
"7See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,762-63 (1969) ("When an arrest is made,
it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape."). Under
the "protective sweep" exception, police who are inside a home to make a lawful arrest may
make a cursory warrantless inspection, or "sweep," of the premises if they have a reasonable
belief that the areas to be swept may pose a danger to them. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S.
325 (1990).
"8See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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residence.' 9 Because the greenhouse was not fully shielded from public view,2" the
Court concluded that the defendant could not reasonably have expected the contents
of his greenhouse to be immune from examination by an officer seated in an aircraft
flying in navigable airspace at an altitude similar to that routinely used by private
and commercial flights.' Even with these exceptions, the home - especially its
interior - receives greater protection than other venues because it is a place "that
traditionally has been regarded as the center of a person's private life, the bastion
in which one has a legitimate expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth
Amendment." '
Thus, the exceptions articulated for searches inside private
residences are drawn narrowly.
A classic case in which the Supreme Court articulated this principle is Kyllo v.
United States.23 The Kyllo Court was asked to consider whether aiming a thermal
imaging device from a public street to scan the interior of a home (to determine
whether the heat emanating from the home was consistent with the type of intensity
that radiates from lamps used to grow marijuana) is a search. 4 The government
argued that it could use this sense-enhancing technology without first obtaining a
warrant because the defendant made no attempt to prevent or otherwise conceal the
heat that escaped from the home, and thus had no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the exterior temperature of his home. Moreover, the government contended that
using an external device to scan the interior heat was not a search because it failed
to expose any intimate details of the defendant's life, did not show any people or
activities that were taking place in the home, and could not reveal conversations that
were taking place during the scan.25
The Supreme Court observed the difficulty it faced in deciding whether a search
occurred, given the use of technology that did not exist at the time the Fourth
Amendment was adopted. In rejecting the government's arguments, the Court
initially noted that the sense-enhancing technology the police used was not in
general public use and that it allowed the government to obtain information
concerning the home's interior that would have not been possible without using the
technology.26 Though conceding that the government is entitled to use some
technological devices that did not exist at the time the Fourth Amendment was
See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
20 Though the homeowner intended - and probably expected - that the greenhouse
would not be open to public inspection (and took precautions to protect against ground-level
observation), the sides and roof of the greenhouse were left partially open, thus exposing the
contents of the greenhouse to viewing from the air. Id. at 450.
21 Id. at 450-52.
22 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 883 (1987) (Blaclanun, J., dissenting).
23 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
'9

25

Id. at 29.
Id. at 30, 35-39.

26

Id. at 34.
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adopted, the Court stressed that the government did more than just engage in
"naked-eye" surveillance of a home and that this technology potentially allowed the
government to "shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy."27 Because the government
obtained information that "would have previously been unknowable without
physical intrusion," the Court concluded that the surveillance was a presumptively
unreasonable warrantless search.2 8
The Supreme Court affirmed the principle that interior searches, even if
conducted pursuant to a warrant, are to be closely scrutinized in Richards v.
Wisconsin.29 The Court in Richards was asked to consider whether police officers
are required to knock and announce their presence when executing a search warrant
in a felony drug investigation." The Court acknowledged the possibility that felony
drug crimes will involve an extremely high risk of serious (if not deadly) injury to
the police and that suspects may destroy or dispose of drugs before the police
enter.3 ' The Court concluded, however, that not all felony drug investigations pose
these risks. Given this, the Court required police, before they may dispense with
the knock-and-announce requirement, to provide either specific information about
the potential danger of a search or the likelihood of evidence being destroyed.32
The government argued that, because a warrant gives officers the authority to
enter a private residence, only a minimal violation of privacy occurs when officers
search the home without announcing their presence. While acknowledging that noknock entries are less intrusive than warrantless searches, the Court rejected the
suggestion that the reasonableness analysis ends once the warrant has been issued.3
As a result, the Court refused to minimize the individual interests implicated by an
authorized, but unannounced, forcible entry.34
C. Warrant Specificity
The Fourth Amendment requires that the warrant describe the items to be seized
with "as much specificity as the government's knowledge and circumstances
allow."3 5 The specificity requirement both limits the discretion of the executing
officer and informs the subjected person where the officer is entitled to search.36
27 Id. at

33-34.
Id. at 40.
29 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
30 Id. at 389-92.
"' Id. at 391.
32 Id. at 392-93.
33 Id. at 394.
34 Id. at 393 n.5.
35 United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1988).
36 See, e.g., Rickert v. Sweeney, 813 F.2d 907, 909 (8th Cir. 1987) (requiring that a
warrant be specific in describing the items to be taken).
20
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Thus, warrants that authorize the government to search for any evidence relating to
the commission of a crime, that refer to a broad federal statute to limit the scope of
the warrant, or that generally allow "an exploratory rummaging of a person's
belongings"3 7 are conclusively invalid. 8 For example, a warrant that authorized the
seizure of any property that was evidence that the defendant violated the federal
mail fraud statute,39 or a warrant that is limited only by references to the parameters
provided by a general conspiracy or tax evasion statute,4" fail to sufficiently limit
the scope of a search warrant. Likewise, warrants that authorize a search or seizure
of "all records" generally will be found to be overbroad, especially if it is an all
records search of a residence.4 ' A general warrant will not be held invalid if the
government has done the best that reasonably could be expected under the
circumstances or otherwise has acquired all descriptive facts which a reasonable
investigation could be expected to cover.42 In other words, if information was not
available to make the warrant more particular, then the use of generic terms will not
invalidate it.43 However, a warrant that is capable of being specific but fails to
sufficiently particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized is
unconstitutionally overbroad."'
Though evidence seized during a general search ordinarily must be excluded

31 United States v. LeBron, 729

F.2d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding the search warrant
to be overbroad and, therefore, invalid).
31 See United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding the warrant
to be overbroad, because it authorized a search for other evidence relating to the commission
of a crime).
3' Roche v. United States, 614 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that a warrant must be
limited to evidence supporting probable cause).
40 See, e.g., Rickert, 813 F.2d at 909 (noting that the general conspiracy and
tax evasion
statutes included in the warrant "do not limit the search in any substantive manner").
4' See United States v. Humphrey, 104 F.3d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the
language in a search warrant must identify evidence that directly links to the criminal
investigation).
42 United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 604 (10th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Fuccillo,
808 F.2d 173, 176 (1st Cir. 1987).
41 Humphrey, 104 F.3d at 69.
4
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485-86 (1965). The specificity requirement is
designed to ensure that the government will limit its search only to the areas in which it has
probable cause to believe the item in question will be found. As noted in Maryland v.
Garrison:

The manifest purpose of [the] particularity requirement was to prevent general
searches. By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for
which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will
be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the

wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.
480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
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from the criminal trial,4" the good faith exception sometimes is applied to a facially
invalid wan-ant. That is, if an officer performs a search pursuant to a facially
overbroad warrant, the search will not be invalidated unless the wan-ant was so
facially deficient that the executing officer could not have reasonably, and in good
faith, believed that it authorized the search.46 Lower courts, however, have
narrowly construed this good faith exception, particularly when - as discussed
earlier4 7 - the search warrant provided only generic information even though the
searching officer appeared to have possessed information that could have been used
to limit the scope of the search."
D. Special Needs/Administrative Searches
Notwithstanding the importance of the warrant requirement, warrantless
searches - even of private homes - may be authorized if the search is needed to
protect the public or to advance legitimate governmental interests. The Supreme
Court has permitted exceptions to the warrant requirement where special
governmental needs make either that requirement or the probable cause requirement
impracticable. 9 Thus, the Court has recognized the congressional authority to enact
laws that sanction either warrantless searches or searches based on warrants issued
with less than probable cause, even if the "quantum of evidence" used to justify the
search would not support the grant of a search warrant in the criminal context.5
These "special needs" or "administrative" searches are conducted pursuant to state

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-87 (1976) (discussing the court's stance on the
exclusionary rule).
46 Id. at 486.
47 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
48 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
49 For example, the Court has authorized warrantless searches of employees' desks and
offices on less than probable cause. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). Similar
treatment has been given to warrantless searches of student property. See New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
SO See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 n.4 (1987) ("In the administrative
search context, we formally require that administrative warrants be supported by 'probable
cause,' because in that context we use that term as referring not to a quantum of evidence,
but merely to a requirement of reasonableness."); see also United States v. Gordon, 655 F.2d
478 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that a warrantless search of an insurance business by federal
insurance regulators did not violate the Fourth Amendment due to the long-standing tradition
of "close supervision and inspection" of the insurance industry); Paramount Pictures Corp.
v. Doe, 821 F. Supp. 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting generally that, in the civil context, the
reasonableness standard is less demanding than in the criminal context); Nixon v. Adm'r of
Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 366 (D.D.C. 1976) ("[A] less strict and particularized
government showing is necessary to comply with the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
requirement when the search is entirely 'civil' in nature.").
'5
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or federal regulations5 and generally are upheld if there is a strong governmental
need to protect the public safety.
1. Searches of Businesses
Courts are more likely to permit special needs/administrative searches of
businesses than homes. Indeed, federal courts routinely authorize searches of
businesses in pervasively regulated enterprises that have a long tradition of
supervision and inspection.5 2 The Supreme Court has held that warrantless
inspections are permissible if the searches are reasonably necessary to further an
important federal interest and if the regulatory scheme is comprehensive and
predictable.53 Furthermore, the Court has noted that, if the industry is regulated
closely and the owner of the business is required to either obtain a federal license
or comply with complex federal regulations, administrative searches are permissible
because the owner has notice that the government will periodically inspect the
business for specific purposes." Courts generally uphold the constitutionality of
administrative searches based largely on their conclusion that people who choose
to participate in a closely regulated business - or accept a federal license knowingly and willingly accept both the burdens (including unannounced or
5' See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (conducting a search pursuant to New
York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 15(a)(5)); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 3i6
(1972) (conducting a search pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 21); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (conducting a search pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 5146);
United States v. Jamieson-McKarnes Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 651 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1981)
(conducting a search pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 374(a)); United States v. Goff 677 F. Supp.
1526 (D. Utah 1987) (conducting a search pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 22).
52 See Colonnade CateringCorp., 397 U.S. at 76-77; Costantini v. Med. Bd., No. 9316926, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 22025, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 1994) (citing Rush v. Obledo,
756 F.2d 713, 719 (9th Cir. 1985)).
" Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
was not violated by warrantless searches executed to protect the public's health and safety).
"' Id. at 600. For example, in United States v. Goff,677 F. Supp. 1526 (D. Utah 1987),
the district court considered the identity of the agency - the Treasury Department - that
filed a motion to suppress evidence (guns and other firearms) seized on the business premises
of a licensed firearms manufacturer. Id. at 1529. Although the agents actually obtained a
warrant in this case, the district court concluded that warrants are not required for regulatory
inspections of federally licensed firearms dealers, because the Secretary of the Treasury (or
its designee) is statutorily authorized to inspect both the dealer's records and the actual
firearms. Id. at 1537. Therefore, the dealer should have been on notice that his property
might be searched. Id. at 1545-46; see 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (2000); see also New York v.
Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (authorizing the warrantless search of ajunkyard); Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (authorizing the search of a business in the mining industry);
Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316, noted in Goff, 677 F. Supp. at 1533 nn.4-5 (reasoning that a
firearms dealer reasonably should expect unannounced, warrantless searches to occur).
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warrantless searches)55 and benefits of engaging in that business. By voluntarily
agreeing to participate in a closely regulated industry, courts reason that the
6
5
participants have a lesser expectation of privacy.
Courts have authorized administrative searches of businesses that were not part
of a pervasively regulated industry only when there was a legitimate governmental
need for the search. For example, the IRS requested an ex parte order to enter
private property to search and seize property for delinquent taxes." In that case, the
IRS argued that the search was authorized by a federal statute granting federal
district courts jurisdiction to issue writs and "such other orders and processes, and
to render such judgments and decrees as may be necessary or appropriate.""8 In
evaluating the reasonableness of the search, the Tenth Circuit relied on Supreme
Court cases that characterized tax collection as a paramount right of the federal

"

For example, the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless, non-consensual inspection of

a locked storeroom of a federally licensed alcoholic beverage dealer's business premises in
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States. Federal law required federally licensed alcohol

dealers to consent to inspections of their premises. Colonnade CateringCorp., 397 U.S. at
73-74. The dealer in this case refused to consent to an inspection. The Court upheld the
warrantless, non-consensual search based on: (1) the long history of regulating the liquor
industry; (2)the statutory authorization for agents to search the business; and (3) the fact that
the historical regulation and the statute gave the defendant notice that its premises were
subject to search by federal agents. Id. at 77. Likewise, federal courts routinely uphold
warrantless or administrative searches ofpharmacies and pharmaceutical companies because
of this industry's "long history of supervision and inspection." Jamieson-McKames
Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 651 F.2d at 537. Federal regulations provide that federal agents may
enter (at reasonable times) and inspect establishments that manufacture food, drugs, devices,
or cosmetics. 21 U.S.C. § 374(a) (2000). Courts justify giving drug manufacturers decreased
privacy rights primarily due to the strong public interest in protecting the consuming public
from defective drug products. Thus, the court concluded that government agents could search
a pharmaceutical company without a warrant in United States v. Jamieson-McKames

Pharmaceuticals,651 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1981), in part, because this business is part of a
pervasively regulated industry. Jamieson-McKamesPharmaceuticals,Inc., 651 F.2d at 537.
For similar reasons, the court in United States v. Prendergastaffirmed a criminal conviction
of a business searched by DEA agents to ensure that it was complying with the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. United States v. Prendergast, 585
F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1978).
56 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973); Biswell, 406 U.S. at
315-16; cf Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
[T]he validity ofthe regulations depends not upon the consent ofthose regulated,
but on the existence of a federal statute embodying a congressional
determination that the public interest... outweighs the businessman's interest
in preventing a Government inspector from viewing those areas of his premises
which relate to the subject matter of the regulation.
Marshall,436 U.S. at 338.
5 Carlson v. Dist. Court, 580 F.2d 1365, 1378 (10th Cir. 1978).
58

26 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (2000).
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government.5 9 The court cited the public interest in tax collection to support its
conclusion that the IRS was not required to show probable cause to conduct the
administrative search. Instead, the court opined that the public need for effective
enforcement of federal tax laws justified the intrusion on the lower standard of
reasonableness applicable to administrative searches. 6
2. Searches of Homes
Special needs/administrative searches of homes are scrutinized more closely
than searches of businesses and generally will be permitted only when public health
or safety needs outweigh the homeowner's privacy rights. Camarav. Municipal
Court,6 2 the first Supreme Court case to directly address the Fourth Amendment's
applicability to administrative searches, considered a statute that allowed city
employees to enter and search private residences in apartment buildings if the
search was necessary for the performance of their duties.63 The Court held that the
Fourth Amendment prevented building inspectors from entering private residences
to search for building code violations unless they first obtained a warrant." While
agreeing that "a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is
a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and
instrumentalities of crime," the Court stressed that the Fourth Amendment applies
to more than suspected criminal behavior.65 The Court concluded that: (1) a
person's private property is fully protected; (2) warrantless administrative searches
significantly intrude upon an individual's privacy interests; and (3) the statutory
authority for warrantless administative searches was "insufficient to justify so
substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment's protections." 6
While holding that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment, the
Court stated that, under certain circumstances, administrative inspections can be
Carlson,580 F.2d at 1374 (citing United States v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 368 U.S.
291 (1961); see also G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 350 (1977)
(describing the "voluntary compliance in the collection of taxes... as 'the life-blood of
government') (quoting Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935)).
60 Carlson, 580 F.2d at 1380-81.
61 Id. at 1373.
62 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
63 Id. at 526 (citing S.F., CAL., HOusING CODE § 503). While conducting a routine
inspection of the apartment building, a housing inspector attempted to search the defendant's
apartment because ofa suspicion that there were housing code violations. The defendant was
arrested after he refused (several times) to permit the inspector to search his apartment. Id.
at 526-27.
4 See id. at 534.
65 Id. at 530.
66 Id. at 534.
S9
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conducted if needed to protect the public health and safety.67 The Court initially
observed that the goal of the search in Camara was to secure compliance with
physical standards for private property and that there is a strong governmental
interest in preventing the "development of conditions that are hazardous to public
health and safety., 68 Although the Court stated that the reasonableness standard of
the Fourth Amendment is still the "ultimate standard," it concluded that the showing
needed to obtain a "suitably restricted search warrant" for an administrative
inspection for health or safety violations is different from the showing necessary for
the issuance of a criminal search warrant.69 Specifically, the Court noted that a
strong public interest, coupled with the fact that the search is "neither personal in
nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime," eliminated the need for
inspectors to show probable cause that a violation existed to obtain the required
warrant." Instead, the Court determined that if a "valid public interest justifies the
intrusion contemplated," then there is probable cause in a civil setting to issue the
search warrant.7"
Another Supreme Court decision, Michigan v. Tyler,72 also approved of the use
of administrative searches while illustrating the heightened standard imposed on
searches of a private residence. The Court was asked to decide whether fire
inspectors may make warrantless entries into private residences to determine
whether a fire was the result of arson. 73 The Court found that a property owner's
expectation of privacy is not diminished and the owner does not have lesser Fourth
Amendment protections merely because a firefighter conducts a search while
attempting to ascertain the cause of a fire, rather than for the purpose of discovering
evidence of a crime. 74 The Court agreed that the Fourth Amendment applies to
entries and searches by fire officials but refused to require firefighters to obtain
warrants before entering buildings to fight fires or during the "reasonable time" that
they remain in the buildings "to investigate the cause of [each] blaze."" The Court,
however, held that any additional entry to investigate the cause of a fire must be
made pursuant to the warrant procedures governing administrative searches, and any
search designed to gather evidence for a possible criminal prosecution may be
performed only if the official obtains a warrant upon a traditional showing of
probable cause applicable to searches for evidence of a crime.76 In so holding, the
67
68
69
70

71

72
73
14

71
76

See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967).
Id. at 535.
Id. at 539.
See id. at 537.

Id. at 539.
436 U.S. 499 (1978).
See id. at 501.
Id. at 507-08.
Id. at511.

Id. at511-12.
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Court acknowledged that, if the only purpose of the civil search is to gather
evidence for a criminal prosecution, then the officials performing the search must
obtain a criminal search warrant."
Finally, in Wyman v. James,78 the Court balanced the governmental interest in
protecting minor children - by allowing case workers to visit the homes of the
public aid recipients - against the homeowner's desire for privacy. The Court
found that visits conducted for the purpose of determining the family's continued
eligibility for federal assistance did not violate the Fourth Amendment because no
search occurred.7 9 The Court noted, however, that even if the caseworker's entry
did constitute a search, several factors would make the search reasonable." The
Court initially stressed the public's strong interest in the well-being of dependent
children and stated that their needs are paramount and generally outweigh a
mother's needs or privacy rights.8 Likewise, the Court cited the public interest in
having a "gentle" means of determining that the recipients of tax funds are actually
entitled to receive the funds.82 Moreover, the Court emphasized that the visits were
announced and conducted pursuant to a civil proceeding, "not by the police for
criminal investigation purposes."83 Though the Wyman Court attempted to
characterize the caseworker as a "friend to one in need" and not a "sleuth," it
conceded that if such a visit "should ... lead to the discovery of fraud and a
criminal prosecution should follow, then.., that is a routine and expected fact of
84
life."
Finally, the Court has held that the need to ensure that the public is not harmed
by a probationer's presence in the community creates a special need that "permit[s]
a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied
to the public at large." 85 The Supreme Court recently revisited the constitutionality

7 See id. at 508-09; see also Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (holding that
a vehicle checkpoint program whose primary purpose is to discover and interdict illegal
drugs is an unreasonable search and seizure).
78 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
79See id. at 318.
80 Id.

Id.
Id. at 319.
See id. at 310.
84 Id. at 323. Not surprisingly, while subsequent federal courts citing Wyman have stated
that administrative searches should not be used as a pretext for a criminal prosecution, they
nonetheless have upheld some criminal convictions obtained as a result of evidence found
during warrantless administrative searches. See United States v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,
712-16 (1987) (upholding conviction for possession of stolen property resulting from an
administrative inspection of a junkyard but recognizing, in principle, that such searches
cannot be used as a pretext for a criminal search).
85 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987).
81

82
83
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of warrantless searches of a probationer's home in United States v. Knights. 6 The
probationer in Knights was sentenced to probation for a drug offense and signed a
probation order that required him to submit his person and property to search by a
probation or law enforcement officer at anytime with or without a warrant. 7
Though he signed this order, he later argued that a search of his apartment which
88
revealed explosive devices and drug paraphernalia was unreasonable.
The Court suggested that searches of probationers' homes might not violate the
Fourth Amendment because the government's interest in apprehending violators of
the criminal law and protecting potential victims of crime may justify depriving a
probationer of certain freedoms (including privacy) enjoyed by law-abiding
citizens.8 9 Because the Court found that the officers had reasonable grounds to
suspect the probationer had violated his parole, it stopped short of holding that the
mere status of being on probation gives the government the right to search a
probationer's home. Instead, the Court based its holding on the fact that the
probationer voluntarily consented to the searches when he signed the probation
order.9 Though the Court acknowledged that the search provision affected the
probationer's privacy rights, the majority stressed that the probationer's knowledge
of (and consent to) this provision "significantly diminished [his] reasonable
expectation of privacy."91
II. THE PROPRIETY OF SEARCHING DEBTORS' HOMES

A. Role of the Chapter 7 Trustee
When an individual or business files a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code, a trustee will either be appointed or, in rare instances, elected.92
The Office of the United States Trustee (OUST), a component of the Department
of Justice, monitors the conduct of debtors and appoints, then supervises the
trustees who oversee Chapter 7 cases.93 In most districts, trustees are assigned
randomly from a rotating standing panel of local attorneys or accountants.9 4

87

534 U.S. 112 (2001).
See id. at 114.

88

Id. at 116.

86

89 Id. at 119-20
90 See id.

"' Id. at 120.

See id. §§ 701-702. In most cases, the appointed interim trustee will continue to serve
throughout the case. The Code does, however, give creditors the right to elect a trustee to
replace the interim trustee. See id. § 702.
9'See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a) (2000).
94See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Research & Planning, The United States Trustee's
Role in Consumer Bankruptcy Cases, at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/fs05_duties92
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Although panel trustees operate under the direction of the OUST, they are not
government employees.95
Chapter 7 panel trustees' primary responsibilities are to collect assets, maximize
those assets for distribution to creditors, and report debtors who appear to have
engaged in criminal conduct to law enforcement officers.96 Specifically, once a
bankruptcy case is filed, title and right to the possession of the property of the
estate 97 passes to the panel trustee, whose primary responsibility is to use or sell all
non-exempt 98 assets to pay creditor claims.99 The panel trustee will manage the
debtor's non-exempt assets,' 00 investigate the debtor's financial affairs, pay her
debts, and object (if necessary) to claims creditors file in the bankruptcy case.' '
The trustee has an obligation to furnish information concerning the estate upon the
request of any party in interest (which includes all creditors) in the debtor's case. 02
Assuming the debtor has not engaged in acts of misconduct (typically involving
fraud or hiding assets), she will receive a discharge after the panel trustee completes
her duties.'03 In contrast, if the debtor has concealed property, failed to keep proper
documentation of her financial affairs, or otherwise engaged in fraudulent acts, the
trustee (or a creditor) may object to the debtor's discharge and examine the debtor's
"acts and conduct" to determine whether grounds exist to deny a discharge.'0 4
Indeed, trustees have several remedies in cases where debtors fail to adequately
account for property. Ifa debtor disposes of property during the period immediately
consumercases.htm (describing process UST uses to appoint Chapter 7 trustee panels) (last
updated Apr. 18, 2002) [hereinafter U.S. Trustee's Role in Consumer Bankruptcy Cases].
's The web site of the United States Trustee stresses that panel trustees "are private
parties, not government employees." See Chapter 7 Panel Trustees: Office Locator, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/library/chapter07/7.htm#VA (last updated Mar. 27, 2003); see also
About Bankruptcy and the U.S. Trustee Program, at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/
about ustp.htm (referring to panel trustees as "private estate trustees") (last updated Mar. 27,
2003).
96 See 1I U.S.C. § 704 (2000); see also id. § 1106.
17 A debtor's bankruptcy estate consists ofall property wherever located.
11 U.S.C. §541
(2000).
98 Debtors are allowed to exempt certain property of the estate from creditors, and thus
the trustee, based on the Code or, where applicable, state law. Id. §522(b)(1) (providing that
states may opt-out of the federal bankruptcy exemption scheme and allow its residents to
exempt property only under applicable state law).
'9 Elizabeth Warren, nhatIs a Women 'sIssue?Bankruptcy, CommercialLaw,and Other
GenderNeutral Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19,41 (2002); see also U.S. Trustee's Role
in Consumer Bankruptcy Cases, supra note 101 (describing prevalence of no-asset cases).
00 The debtor will be allowed to keep (or "exempt") certain assets under either the
Bankruptcy Code or applicable state law. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2000).
10' Id. § 704.
'02 Id. § 704(7).
03 Id. § 727(a).
Id. § 727(c)(1)-(2).
Io
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before the bankruptcy filing, or if she makes unauthorized property transfers after
the filing, under certain circumstances the trustee can recover the transferred
property from the third-party transferee. 5 Moreover, if a debtor knowingly and
fraudulently makes a false declaration or statement under penalty of perjury in
relation to any bankruptcy case, she can be fined or imprisoned.0 6 Finally, if the
panel trustee suspects that the debtor has committed bankruptcy fraud, he must
report this suspicion to the United States Attorney."°7
B. Overview of a Debtor'sBankruptcy Obligations
Debtors are required to file a list of creditors, disclose their assets, liabilities,
current income and expenditures, and file a statement of their financial affairs. '
These documents (which are filed either with the clerk's office or electronically)
become a matter of public record and must disclose the description, location, and
market value of the debtor's property.'0 9 Debtors also must consent to be examined
at a meeting of their creditors (or at other times as ordered by the court)."0 In
addition, they are required to cooperate with the trustee's preparation of an
inventory of their property and must give the trustee their non-exempt property
(which will become property of the bankruptcy estate) and any documents relating
to property of the estate. "' Debtors must help the trustee perform its duties"' and
specifically are required to give the trustee all property that the trustee may use, sell,
or lease to maximize the recovery to creditors on their claims." 3
C. Searches in Bankruptcy Cases
Most judicial opinions involving searches performed in bankruptcy cases arise
out of actual or threatened criminal prosecutions. For example, in UnitedStates v.
Travers," 4 the Eleventh Circuit considered an overly broad warrant in an appeal of
'o' See id. §§ 547-549. For example, trustees have the right to recover some transfers
made within ninety days of the bankruptcy filing as preferences under § 547, can recover
fraudulently conveyed property under § 548, and can avoid property transfers made after the
bankruptcy filing under § 549.
106 18 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000).
107 See 18 U.S.C. § 3057 (2000). The OUST also has a duty to notify the U.S. Attorney
if it appears that a debtor has engaged in criminal acts. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(F) (2000).
"I 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (2000).
'09 See Official Bankr. Form 6, Sched. B, 11 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2002).
"0 11 U.S.C. § 343 (2000); BANKR. R. 4002.
I" § 521(3)-(4).
Id.
112 Id. § 521(3); BANKR. R. 4002.
113 See 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2000).
114 233 F.3d 1327 (llthCir. 2000).

2002]

NON-CONSENSUAL SEARCHES OF HOMES

a bankruptcy fraud conviction. The defendant was accused of orchestrating a
complex financial fraud scheme and was charged with mail fraud, bankruptcy fraud,
equity skimming, and money laundering." 5 Though ultimately concluding that the
officers acted in good faith, the district court held that the search warrant was overly
broad because it authorized the officer to search for all documents or materials that
reflected potential fraud." 6 The Eleventh Circuit stressed that when a warrant "is
so overly broad on its face that [an] executing officer[] could not reasonably...
presume[] it to be valid," the officer conducting the search would not be deemed to
have acted in objective good faith." 7
In another bankruptcy case, United States v. Patrick,"' the United States
Inspector General, at the request of the Government Printing Office, applied for a
search warrant to be executed on the premises owned by a debtor company. After
the Chapter 7 trustee consented to the search, the defendants (officers of the debtor)
argued that the trustee lacked the authority to waive the debtor's Fourth Amendment
rights by consenting to the search.' The bankruptcy court was asked to consider
"whether a bankruptcy trustee can waive [a] debtor's Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searche[s] and seizure[s]."' 2 °
The court concluded that a trustee has the right to cooperate with a criminal
investigation of the debtor corporation, including consenting to a search of
corporate books and records. 2' The court then considered whether the warrant was
overbroad because it permitted the government to search and seize all business
records and neither limited which documents could be seized nor suggested how the
documents related to specific criminal activity. 22 The court concluded that the
warrant did not satisfy the Fourth Amendment specificity requirement because it
failed to confine the search to particularly described evidence related to a specific
crime for which there was probable cause.' 23 The court further rejected the
government's good faith defense, finding that the degree of overbreadth and lack
24
of particularity of the warrant precluded a reasonable reliance on the warrant.
25
In re Benny is another case that involved a criminal prosecution of a debtor.
At the request of the U.S. Postal Service, the Chapter 7 trustee filed change of
address requests to have the debtor's mail rerouted from his business and residential
"I
16

117

Id. at 1330.

Id. at 1330-31.
Id. at

1330.

916 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. W. Va. 1996).
Id. at 569-70.
I9
120 Id. at 570.
121 Id. at 571.
122 Id. at 573.
113 Id. at 574.
14 Patrick, 916 F. Supp. at 574.
12' 29 B.R. 754 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
11
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addresses to the trustee's office. 2 6 The trustee did not give the debtor notice or an
opportunity to object, and he did not have a court order that specifically approved
the mail redirection.' 27 The trustee contended that, because he had the right to
operate the debtor's business, he also had the right to receive any mail addressed to
the business. 2" Because the trustee received letters from the debtor's criminal
defense and bankruptcy counsel, the debtor argued that the redirection damaged the
attorney-client relationship.2 9 The court considered both the First and Fourth
Amendment ramifications of a trustee's unilateral decision to re-direct mail of a
130
debtor under indictment for mail fraud.
The court characterized the practice of redirecting a debtor's mail as an
"intrusion into personal matters" and stated that such an unregulated ability to
redirect a debtor's personal and business mail would be an "overbroad invasion of
privacy" that was not justified by the need to obtain information about the debtor's
assets which may be transmitted through the mail.' The court further observed
that allowing an unrestricted mail redirection would "permit, if not encourage,
trustees to intrude upon the privacy" of a debtor's communications with his
attorney. 32 In considering whether the redirection violated the protections afforded
by the First Amendment, the court stated that the "demands of efficiency and
enforcement of the bankruptcy laws do not necessarily outweigh interests in privacy
' 33
and free expression."'
Though the court's opinion primarily focused on the First Amendment
implications of redirecting the debtor's mail, it also considered whether the mail
redirection violated the Fourth Amendment by treating the redirection as a
government seizure. 34 Because the bankruptcy and criminal proceedings were
"intricately interwoven" and the trustee is statutorily authorized to "communicate
regularly with creditors who may have a particular interest in assisting the criminal
prosecution,"'' 3 the court was particularly troubled by the trustee's ability to
unilaterally redirect the debtor's mail without giving the debtor notice.'36 The court
ultimately sanctioned the use of mail redirection, but only if the trustee gives the
37
debtor notice before commencing the redirection.1
26

Id. at 757.

127

Id.

128

Id.

129
130

Id. at 758.
Id. at 765-69.

'3'

Benny, 29 B.R. at 764-65.

132 Id. at 765.

...
Id. at 766.
13 Id. at 767.
"' Id. at 768.
136 Id. at 761-63.
13' Benny, 29 B.R. at 769-70.
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Finally, the debtor in United States v. Weldon'" moved to suppress evidence
obtained during a warrantless search of his apartment. FBI agents obtained a
warrant to arrest the debtor after receiving reports that the debtor was in possession
39
of money that he knowingly and fraudulently had concealed from the trustee.'
They seized property from his apartment while there to arrest him.' 4' The court

noted that the law enforcement officers were in the apartment because the debtor
was charged with the crime of concealing assets from a panel trustee and the
debtor's possession of concealed assets in the presence of the arresting officers
constituted a crime.' 4' The court authorized the agent's seizure of the debtor's
property by characterizing the property as fruits of a crime (of concealing assets
from the trustee).' 42
Judges tend to react less favorably to requests to search a debtor's property if
the debtor is not the subject of a criminal prosecution. For example, in In re
LuJkin,143 the trustee subpoenaed the debtor's business records from a receiver who
had been appointed to take possession of the debtor's law practice. The trustee
issued the subpoena pursuant to Rule 2004 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
which generally gives parties in interest the right to question a debtor about her acts,
conduct, or property (or her liabilities and financial condition), or any matter which
44
may affect the administration of the debtor's estate or her right to a discharge.
The debtor moved to limit the scope of the Rule 2004 examination and argued that,
because law enforcement officials and a creditor also wanted to see his business
records, the subpoena was a subterfuge for a warrantless search of his records. 45
The court held that the trustee acted within his statutory authority in subpoenaing
the debtor's records in the receiver's possession but prevented the trustee from
granting any third-party access to those documents without prior court approval
unless such access was in response to a search warrant or subpoena issued by a state
or federal court. 46 The court found it "problematic" for a third-party to subpoena
47
business records of the debtor that were in the possession of a third-party. 1
Finally, another bankruptcy court also considered whether panel trustees are
state actors and concluded that they were not.'48 In In re Application of Trustee in
112 F. Supp 192 (S.D. Cal. 1953). This case was decided under the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, the predecessor to the current Bankruptcy Code.
'19 Id.at 193.
"4o Id. at 194.
'4' Id. at 195.
38

142 Id.

41 255 B.R. 204 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000).
'4 Id. at 208.
141 Id. at 213.
146

Id. at214.

147 Id.

"8 See In re Application of Trustee in Bankr. for a Search Warrant, 173 B.R. 341 (N.D.
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Bankruptcyfor a Search Warrant,the trustee asked the bankruptcy court to issue
a search warrant because the trustee suspected that the debtors were unlawfully
secreting assets of the estate. 149 The court's opinion cited Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41, which regulates the issuance of search warrants and provides that
search warrants may be issued "[u]pon the request of a federal law enforcement
officer or an attorney for the government .. ,,S."
This court concluded that a
bankruptcy trustee is neither a federal law enforcement officer nor an attorney for
the government.' 5 ' The opinion also noted that there appeared to be no statutory
authority for a trustee to apply for issuance of a search warrant.' 52 The trustee
asserted that it was entitled to a search warrant because the debtor was secretly and
53
unlawfully hiding assets of the bankruptcy estate.
The court rejected the trustee's argument, finding that, notwithstanding the
trustee's stated purpose, the trustee's true interest in searching the debtor's property
was to uncover criminal activity.'54 The court concluded that neither a private
person, nor an attorney acting on behalf of that person in litigation, has the authority
or responsibility to investigate or prosecute alleged violations of federal law.
Instead, only law enforcement officers or government attorneys have the authority
to search the debtor's property.' Thus, the court opined that the trustee had no
legal basis for obtaining a warrant to search the debtor's home because only the
United States Attorney's Office or another federal law enforcement agency had the
56
authority to investigate criminal activity.1
D. In re Barman"7
1. The Debtor's Acts
The debtor in Barman owned a vending and video machine business and
appeared to have orchestrated a complex scheme to hide property from his creditors
and the Chapter 7 trustee.5 8 Before filing his bankruptcy petition, he appeared to
have removed video machines from his business and hidden his ownership interest

Ohio 1994).
149 Id.
FED. R. CirM. P. 41.
'5' In re Application of Trustee, 173 B.R. at 341.
152 Id.
153id.
154 See id. at 342.
155Id.
156 See

id.at 341.

252 B.R. 403 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
5Id. at410.

'5
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in several real estate parcels." 9 The trustee contended that the debtor purchased a
home (Home I) for himself, titled it in his parents' names, and furnished it with
furniture valued at over $40,000. 60 The debtor then sold Home I (for over
$150,000), used the sale proceeds to purchase Home II(also titled in his parents'
name), and furnished Home 11 with some ofthe furniture from Home .16 Although
the debtor was ordered not to transfer or encumber Home H, he violated that order
by refinancing Home II and transferring the equity proceeds to his parents.'62 The
debtor then withdrew these proceeds from his parents' account, 63 and at
approximately the same time, the debtor's wife purchased Home Il.
164
Notwithstanding these transactions (and the fact that his parents had testified
in their own earlier bankruptcy case that they purchased $5,000 worth of furniture
for him), the debtor listed only $500 in apparel on his bankruptcy schedules 6 and
did not explain how he disposed ofother property. 166 He specifically denied owning
or possessing any video machines even though a process server testified to seeing
fifteen to twenty video machines in the garage of Home rn. 167 Moreover, although
his wife appeared to use the equity proceeds from Home II to purchase Home III,
they denied that he owned this home, even though he lived there and a third-party
(who was involved in post-petition litigation with the debtor) reported that the
6
debtor had a trailer at Home m] that contained personal property. 1
2. The Search
The Chapter 7 trustee suspected that the debtor would soon move himself and
his property from Home III.9 Given his past behavior and what appeared to be his
present intent to continue hiding assets, the trustee brought an ex parte motion to
inspect Home III and appraise (but not seize) any personal property found there. 70
The trustee asked the court to allow a U.S. Marshal, his counsel, and an appraiser
to accompany him during the inspection due to the "past history ofthe Debtor's lack
of cooperation with respect to bankruptcy proceedings."'' The court granted the
9 See id.
at 408-10.
id. at 408.
161 Id.
162 The debtor was given that order in an earlier bankruptcy case involving one of his
businesses. Id.
163 Barman, 252 B.R. at 408.
'64 See id.
165 See id.
'66 See id. at 407.
167 Id. at 408-09.
161 See id.
169 See Barman, 252 B.R. at 409.
170See id. at 407.
'"' See id.at 4 10. The trustee and debtor had a contentious relationship. Indeed, the trustee
160See
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inspection order based on its findings that the debtor's assets most likely consisted
of more than $500 in clothing, that the debtor had a pattern of placing property in
the names of other people, and that it would be difficult to trace assets in the
video/vending machine business. i' In responding to the debtor's argument that the
search violated his Fourth Amendment privacy rights, the Barman court considered
three main issues: (1) whether the trustee is a state actor; (2) whether the search was
73
reasonable; and (3) whether the warrant specified the property to be searched. 1
a. The Trustee as a State Actor
Although the OUST considers panel trustees to be private parties (not
government employees),' 74 the Barman court concluded that trustees were state
actors for Fourth Amendment purposes and, as private parties, had the authority to
search the debtor's home.'
Because the Bankruptcy Code gives trustees the
authority to collect property of the estate and to investigate the debtor's financial
affairs, the court concluded that a trustee acts "under the authority of law when
inspecting a debtor's residence to search for property of the estate."' 76 The court
further noted that an official of the Department of Justice (the OUST) appoints
panel trustees and stressed that such trustees must seek court approval to be paid or
to employ professionals, and are subject to removal by the court.'
While conceding that the trustee is not a government employee, the court found
that a trustee has a relationship "sufficiently close to the government that the
[F]ourth [A]mendment applies." 7 ' The opinion acknowledged that the Bankruptcy
Code does not state or imply an obligation upon the debtor to permit a warrantless
inspection.'79 In addition, the opinion did not cite any statute that specifically
authorizes a panel trustee to apply for - much less execute - a search warrant to

already had requested (and obtained) a restraining order against the debtor.
172 See id.
173 See id. Because this matter came before the court on the Debtor's Motion to Suppress,
much of the court's opinion arguably is dicta as these Motions are designed to suppress
evidence in a criminal prosecution, not a civil proceeding. In denying the motion to suppress,
however, the Barman court raises (and decides) issues that would be applicable if a debtor
sought to sue a Trustee for searching a home in a civil bankruptcy proceeding.
1 See supra note 95.
"7 Barman,252 B.R. at 419.
76 See id. at 412 (citations omitted).
177See id.
' Id.; see also In re Benny, 29 B.R. 754, 764 n. 19 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (stressing that the
trustee is "substantially under the control of the bankruptcy court" and suggesting that "the
action of the trustee may be said to be sufficiently entwined with that of the government to
justify a finding of 'state action').
179See Barman,252 B.R.at 414-15.
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search a debtor's private home. 8 0 Nonetheless, the court concluded that, because
"every aspect of a trustee's position and function is subject to either statutory
obligation or to federal executive or judicial branch control," the Trustee is a state
actor with the right to search a debtor's home.' 8 '
b. Reasonablenessof the Search
The court observed that the standard for reasonableness in a civil or
administrative situation is less stringent than the standard applied in criminal
cases. ' 2 Relying principally on Camara and Wyman, the court found that the
trustee's search of the debtor's residence was reasonable because the trustee could
not "carry out his statutory obligation to account for all of the property of the estate
without an inspection of the debtor's residence." '8 3 Although bankruptcy cases are
designed to give debtors a fresh start and to collectively maximize a debtor's estate
to repay creditors' claims, the court concluded that the trustee's inspection of the
84
debtor's home is attributable to the government, not to private interests.
Moreover, because of the "strong public interest in the full and proper
administration of a bankruptcy case... including a full investigation of the debtor's
assets," the court found the search to be reasonable.' 85
In discussing a debtor's right to privacy, the court noted that debtors are
required to disclose (in files available for inspection by the public) all property they
and their spouses own, as well as the market value of that property. 8 6 Considering
this requirement, the court concluded that the debtor had limited privacy right
because a "natural consequence of the substantial and detailed disclosures that are
inherent in the bankruptcy process" is that people who file for bankruptcy have a
diminished expectation of privacy in their houses, papers, and effects.' 87 The court
reasoned that making these disclosures "substantially reduce[s] a debtor's
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding his property interests."' 8 Though the
court agreed that debtors retain diminished expectations of privacy, it concluded
that this expectation must be balanced against (but, in this case, ultimately is
secondary to) the trustee's interest in fulfilling his statutory obligation to find and
89
administer estate property. 1
180 See id.

"81Id. at412.
12

Id. at413.

183See Barman, 252 B.R. at 417.
114

Id. at 412-13.

's

Id. at 417.
See id. at 414.
Id.

186

187
188

Id.

189 Barman, 252

B.R. at 415-16.
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c. Specificity Requirement
Despite the Fourth Amendment's warrant specificity requirement,'90 the panel
trustee's request did not specifically describe the estate property that was the object
of the search.' ' In addition, the court's inspection order placed no restrictions on

where the trustee could search in Home III even though the debtor's wife (who had
not filed for bankruptcy) lived in the home and arguably owned property located
there. 92 Instead, the court permitted the trustee to search all places in the debtor's
home - both hidden and in plain view.'13 Notwithstanding the breadth of the
search in Barman,the court rejected the debtor's general warrant challenge. 94 The
court concluded that the trustee was not required to list with specificity the places
to be searched because, "if the trustee establishes reason to believe that there are
estate assets on the premises that the trustee proposes to inspect, the [F]ourth
[Almendment permits the trustee the opportunity to inspect those premises without
restriction as to specific property .... ",91
III. CRAFTING REASONABLE SEARCHES IN BANKRUPTCY CASES
Barman,n' though helpful to trustees who are attempting to find and administer
estate property, has troubling implications for those subjected to the search. The
next sections of this Article explain why the search authorized by the Barman
court' 97 was not consistent with the privacy protections traditionally afforded to

residences and why searches generally are inappropriate in bankruptcy cases. I
then suggest ways that trustees, using current law, could persuade debtors to
consent to a search, then conclude by proposing revisions to current law to make
searches in non-criminal bankruptcy cases constitutionally sound.
A. The Barman Search Was Overboard

Though many of the Supreme Court cases discussing the reasonableness of

390

See, e.g., United States v.Travers, 233 F.3d 1327, 1329(11 th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 122

S. Ct. 74 (2001) (discussing Fourth Amendment requirements in a criminal prosecution
involving bankruptcy fraud).
'9'Barman, 252 B.R. at 418.
392 See id. at 417.
19See id. ("[T]he object of inspection may be anywhere in the debtor's residence, hidden
in private places or in plain view .. .

114Id. at 403.
'"

Id. at 419.

196252 B.R. 403 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
SId.at 420.
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residential searches involve warrantless searches (a situation not present in
Barman), the Supreme Court cases that address the need to obtain a warrant and the
exceptions to the warrant requirement nonetheless are instructive because they
demonstrate the Supreme Court's consistent view that a person's home is a greatly
protected venue.'98 Moreover, these cases suggest that, although it might be
appropriate for a trustee to obtain a warrant to search a debtor's business, trustees
should not be allowed to search a debtor's home absent extraordinary circumstances
involving public safety or welfare.'9 9 In any event, the warrant must be specific.
As one court observed: "Because everyone has some kind of secret or other,
most people are anxious that their personal privacy be respected. For that very
human reason the general warrant, permitting police agents to ransack one's
personal belongings, has long been considered abhorrent to fundamental notions of
privacy and liberty."20 The inspection order in Barman was facially deficient in its
description of the items to be seized, as it failed to list the property likely to be
found or to place any limitations on where the trustee could search. 0 ' In addition,
notwithstanding the fact that the debtor's non-debtor spouse lived at - and
purportedly owned - the home, the search failed to limit the trustee to searching
only non-exempt property of the debtor's estate.20 2
In rejecting the debtor's general warrant challenge to the trustee's search of his
home, Barman implicitly agreed that trustees be given the power not only to enter
a debtor's home, but also the right to search every comer of that home.20 3 Such
authority is not consistent with Fourth Amendment principles, which require
warrant specificity unless the government is unable to acquire information that
would limit the search. When, as here, the trustee had information that the debtor
was hiding large objects (furniture and arcade games), the court should have limited
the search to those items and restricted the trustee's search powers to areas in which
these items might reasonably be found.2 A search of the debtor's cabinets,
See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 n.24 (1980) (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)):
"Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave
concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on proper
showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave
concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy
must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent."
199 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
200 United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1992).
20' Barman, 252 B.R. at 418-19; see supra text accompanying notes 192-93.
202 Barman, 252 B.R. at 418-19; see supra text accompanying notes 190-93.
203 Barman, 252 B.R. at 419.
204 See id.
at 409 ("The trustee further alleges the 'probable existence' of property of the
debtor that was not disclosed, including furniture and video machines ....
").
198
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drawers, or closets, for example, would be an overly broad search for these large
iteriis.2"5 Had the court limited the trustee's search powers to the items believed to
be in the debtor's residence and to areas where those items logically could be found,
the intrusive nature of the trustee's search would have been reduced dramatically.
B. The Government Has No CompellingInterest in Non-CriminalBankruptcy
Proceedings
Because of the requirements imposed by the Bankruptcy Code, debtors
reasonably should expect that their creditors, the trustee, and the bankruptcy judge
will scrutinize their personal financial records. 0 6 That is, debtors must disclose
detailed information about their financial affairs in documents filed either in the
bankruptcy court clerk's office or electronically." 7 Individuals who file bankruptcy
petitions on behalf of their businesses also should expect that the Chapter 7 trustee
will either search or seize those business records because the trustee has the
statutory authority to directly operate business debtors.20 8 Moreover, debtors should
expect that law enforcement officers or government attorneys would have the right
to enter and search their homes if they have been indicted for bankruptcy fraud. 0 9
Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or Rules (or any other federal statute or
regulation), however, places debtors on notice of the possibility that a private
attorney or accountant appointed as a Chapter 7 trustee would have the authority to
enter and search their homes in a non-criminal bankruptcy proceeding.
Bankruptcy cases generally do not implicate the public health or safety issues

205

See, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison,480 U.S. 84 (1987), in which the court quipped:

"[P]robable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will not
support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom.. . ." Id. at 87; see also United States v.
Evans, 92 F.3d 540, 543 (7th Cir. 1996) ("If they are looking for a canary's corpse, they can
search a cupboard, but not a locket. If they are looking for an adolescent hippopotamus, they
can search the living room or garage but not the microwave oven.").
206 See supra text accompanying note 176.
207 Because the information debtors include on their electronic filings arguably is available
to anyone who has access to the Internet, government and academic commentators recently
have questioned the use ofelectronic filings, especially in districts where they are mandatory,
because they expose a debtor's sensitive private information (including their social security
numbers) to anyone who has access to the World Wide Web. See OFFICE OF MGMT. &

2001, at 3 (2001)
(finding that the "use of electronic systems provides more efficient services, [but] it may
create new hazards for the privacy ofpersonal information"); Peter C. Alexander & Kelly Jo
Slone, Thinking About the PrivateMatters in Public Documents: Bankruptcy Privacy in an
Electronic Age, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 437 (2001).
208 See 11 U.S.C. § 702 (2000); see also supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
209 See supra text accompanying notes 107, 114-15.
BUDGET, STUDY OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY AND BANKRUPTCY: JANUARY
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raised in administrative search cases. 1 ° Instead, bankruptcy laws are designed to
21
structure the relative rights debtors and creditors have in a debtor's property. 1
Even if the government is a party in interest in a bankruptcy case, it has rights that
are no greater than any other creditor unless it proves that it is acting pursuant to its
"police and regulatory power" rather than acting merely to protect its status as a
creditor.2
Specifically, the Bankruptcy Code contains an exception to the
automatic stay that generally enjoins all collection activities against a debtor" 3 for
the "commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental
unit. . . to enforce such governmental unit's.., police or regulatory power."2 4
Whereas governmental units can continue litigation that relates to its police powers,
that exception would not allow it to file actions, including criminal actions, if the
action is instituted solely for the purpose of collecting a debt.215 Instead, before a
governmental unit will be allowed to proceed against a debtor, a court must
determine the primary purpose of the law that the state is attempting to enforce. If
obtaining the repayment of a debt is the motivating factor behind the institution of
a criminal proceeding, the state would not be allowed to pursue the proceeding
using its police powers.2" 6
2'0 Some of these issues include the need to prevent fire hazards, to protect children, or
to protect the public from defective drugs or the unauthorized manufacture or sale of firearms
or ammunition.
211
212
2

214
215

See In re Blue, 4 B.R. 580, 587 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980).
See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
Id. § 362(a).
Id. § 362(b)(4).
SeeIn re Simonini, 282 D.R. 604, 610-11 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2002); In re Emberton,

263 B.R. 817, 824 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2001).
216 Safety-Kleen, Inc. v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846,864 (4th Cir. 2001) (denying a preliminary
injunction to owners of hazardous waste sites, thereby preventing a state regulatory agency
from closing their facility); Yellow Cab Coop. Ass'n v. Metro Taxi, Inc. (In re Yellow Cab
Coop. Ass'n.), 132 F.3d 591, 597 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding the state public utilities
commission's decision to prohibit full transfer of debtor-taxicab company's operating
certificate to purchaser of debtor's assets was a "governmental regulatory action" and thus
excepted from automatic stay provision); Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States (In re
Universal Life Church, Inc.), 128 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the IRS's
revocation ofdebtor-religious organization's tax exempt status fell within the automatic stay
exception); Javens v. Hazel Park (In re Javens), 107 F.3d 359, 367-68 (6th Cir. 1997)
(finding the municipalities' actions in demolishing condemned buildings of the debtor were
exercises of police powers and excepted from automatic stay); United States v.
Commonwealth Cos. (In re Commonwealth Cos.), 913 F.2d 518, 523 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990)
(stating that the government was not prohibited from joining debtors in a civil fraud suit);
NLRB v. Edward Cooper Painting, Inc., 804 F.2d 934, 942 (6th Cir. 1986) (analyzing the
National Labor Relations Board's unfair labor practice proceeding against a corporate
employer that had filed a bankruptcy petition allowed under exception); EEOC v. Rath
Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 325-26 (8th Cir. 1986) (allowing Title VII action against debtor
because it vindicated the public interest, though the enforcement of money judgment against
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Notwithstanding the Barmancourt's attempt to draw comparisons between the
search in this case and those sanctioned by the Supreme Court in other civil
contexts," 7 discovering assets that will be included in a debtor's bankruptcy estate
and then used to pay a debt is a private, commercial dispute. ' Although the trustee
statutorily has the right to manage a debtor's estate, the trustee will not be allowed
to maximize the value of the debtor's property by using or selling estate property
until it is clear that the property is included in the estate" 9 and that the debtor does
not have the right to exempt the property under applicable law. In addition, even
if the property is included in the estate and cannot be exempted, the trustee is
entitled to only so much of that property as is necessary to pay creditor claims.22 °
Allowing a debtor to hide property from his creditors arguably would make the
federal bankruptcy court a vehicle for fraud, though that would be true any time a
private plaintiff used the federal court system to pursue relief but refused to fully
comply with the rules of court. Moreover, as the next section notes, if a private
party suspects that an adversary is withholding information or documents in private
litigation, their recourse is to seek sanctions - not to search their adversary's
home.
C. Civil LitigantsHave No Right to Search Their Adversary's Homes
Parties in civil litigation in federal court may demand that their adversary: (1)
2
produce copies of documents that will be used to support its claims or defenses;
(2) disclose the names of witnesses (including experts) Who may testify at trial; 22
(3) respond to interrogatory requests; 23(4) testify under oath in a deposition;2 4 and
even submit to physical or mental examination if the person's physical or mental
'
condition "is in controversy."225
If a party involved in commercial civil litigation
is asked to produce documents but either claims that the documents do not exist or
refuses to produce them, the requesting party does not have the right to search the

debtor was improper).
217 Barman, 252 B.R. at 415-16.
218 It is, of course, possible that a governmental entity may also be a creditor. Though this
gives the public a greater interest in the case, the nature of the dispute would remain debt
collection, not public safety.
219 Certain property is excluded from the bankruptcy estate. This property includes a
debtor's interest in a spendthrift trust and a tax-qualified retirement plan. 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(c)(2) (2000).
220 Id. § 704.
221 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(B), 34(a).
222

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
R. Civ. P. 33.

223 FED.
224 FED.

R. Civ. P. 28.

225 FED.

R. Civ. P. 35.
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non-producing party's home even ifthe requesting party has proof that information
relevant to the litigation - or demanded pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure - is contained in the home. Likewise, if a governmental unit is a
litigant, the government does not have the authority to search another party's home
if the dispute between the two parties involves a simple commercial dispute.
Instead, a party who fails to comply fully with an appropriate discovery request may
be sanctioned and ordered to pay his adversary's costs and expenses, have a claim
or defense dismissed, and in some circumstances, have a default judgment entered
against it.226
This same discovery process, and the rights of parties to refuse certain
discovery requests, applies in most disputes between a trustee and a debtor
concerning property of the estate because the discovery rules applicable to federal
civil litigation also apply to most bankruptcy proceedings. 2 7 For example,
O'Halloran v. Williams,22 the trustee sought to recover funds that the debtor
corporations had transferred to third parties. The trustee sent interrogatories and
requests for production of documents to one of the debtor's former directors.229
When the director refused to respond to certain interrogatories, raising the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the trustee did not then have the
authority to search the director's home to obtain the documents.230 Instead, the
court concluded that because complying with the trustee's request (made in a civil
bankruptcy proceeding) gave the former director "reasonable cause to apprehend
danger," the former director had the right to refuse to respond to the discovery
requests.'
The court reasoned that the director had properly invoked his Fifth
Amendment privilege.232
Although litigants in private commercial disputes do not have the right to search
their adversaries' homes, they do - under certain limited circumstances - have
the right to ask a court to seize their adversaries' property before a judgment is
entered. Specifically, Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
applies in bankruptcy proceedings, 233provides that a party may request a court order
allowing it to seize specified property for the purpose of securing the satisfaction
of any judgment ultimately entered in the case.234 However, the Federal Rules of
226 FED. R. Civ.

P. 37(b).
Whether the dispute is characterized as an adversarial proceeding or a contested matter,
the discovery rules apply. See BANKR. R. 6009, 7001, 7026-37, 9014.
228 259 B.R. 391 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000).
229 See id. at 397.
230 Id. at 399, 404.
231 Id. at 402.
232 Id.
227

233 BANKR.

R. 7064.

R. CIv. P. 64. However, such a seizure may violate due process if it occurs
without notice or a prior hearing. See N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
234 FED.
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Civil Procedure do not give a plaintiff (or a trustee) the right to search her
adversary's home pre-judgment, even if the plaintiff may have reasonable cause to
believe that the debtor is hiding assets. The private party's rights under federal law
and a majority of state laws are limited to having specifically identified property
seized - temporarily - until the underlying litigation is resolved or the court
235
determines that the seizure is unwarranted.
Because the trustee is entitled to manage the debtor's non-exempt estate
property, the trustee arguably could be treated like a judgment creditor who has the
right to obtain a writ of execution to direct a law enforcement officer to levy and
sell non-exempted goods to satisfy the judgment.236 However, a recent state
(1975) (holding a Georgia garnishment statute violative of due process because: (1) it
permitted the court clerk to issue the writ based on a conclusory affidavit provided by the
plaintiff; (2)there was no provision for an early hearing; (3)the defendant was denied access
to and use of the garnished property pending litigation; and (4) the law gave the defendant
no method other than filing a bond to dissolve the writ).
...
In limited circumstances, plaintiffs will be permitted to attach or seize a defendant's
property pre-judgment. In most cases, the plaintiff must file an affidavit with the court that
sets forth the nature of her claim, the amount of damages, the type ofproperty to be attached,
and the value ofthat property. In addition, the plaintiffmust give the defendant proper notice
and a chance, in most cases, for a preliminary hearing. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52278e (West 2002) (permitting attachment upon plaintiff's demonstration of probable cause
that a judgment will be rendered in her favor, and upon a showing of reasonable likelihood
that the defendant will flee or dispose of property (yet affording defendant the right to a
hearing to object to the attachment), requiring that the plaintiff post bond or show that his
property is exempt); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-501 to 16-502 (1996) (permitting attachment
upon a showing that the plaintiff has a "just right" to recover, that the defendant "has
removed or is about to remove" or attach his property, and that the plaintiffhas posted a bond
for twice the amount of her claim); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-18-402 (2002) (permitting
attachment upon filing a copy of the writ with the court and serving notice on the defendant);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51 I-A: 1, 51 1-A:2, 51 I-A:8 (2002) (permitting attachment upon
notice to defendant of his right to a preliminary hearing and, in exceptional circumstances,
permitting attachment prior to providing notice to the defendant); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 387-1 to 38-7-8 (Michie 2002) (allowing pre-judgment attachment when the plaintiff files an
affidavit with the court and posts bond for at least double the estimated value of the property
to be attached, as well as affording the defendant an opportunity for a pre-judgment hearing);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-201 (Michie 2002) (permitting pre-judgment attachment upon
filing of an affidavit attesting to: (1) the value of the property seeking to be attached; (2) the
good faith basis for the pre-judgment attachment, and (3) the grounds for the attachment).
236 See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-66-104, 16-66-110 (Michie 2002) (permitting judgment
creditor to obtain a writ of execution directing the sheriff to enter the debtor's property and
take possession of specified property or money equal to the amount the property to be
seized); IDAHO CODE § 11-102 (Michie 2002) (permitting the issuance of a writ of execution
describing the specific details of the judgment and allowing the sheriff to enter onto the
debtor's property to satisfy the judgment and costs out of the debtor's real or personal
property); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-213 (2002) (allowing a writ of execution to be issued
by a judge against the debtor upon the filing of an affidavit by the judgment creditor
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supreme court opinion questioned the state's interest in searches pursuant to debt
2 38 considered
collection lawsuits.237 The court in Dorwart v. Caraway
a Montana
statute that allowed judgment creditors to obtain a writ of execution to seize a
debtor's personal property by filing apraecipewith the clerk's office. As an initial
matter, although the writ expressly authorized entry into a private home to seize
specifically identified property, it did not authorize officials to enter the private
home to search for that property.239 The issuance of the writ itself was purely
ministerial and required no action or review by a court.24° The Montana Supreme
Court held that law enforcement officials must obtain a writ of execution issued by
a judge upon reasonable cause before entering a private residence to search or seize
property located at the residence.'
The State Attorney General argued that the search should be permitted due to
the state's compelling interest in "the enforcement of monetary judgments by the
seizure of ajudgment debtor's property and the preservation of the credibility of the
'
judicial system."242
The Court acknowledged that certain state interests including when the state acts to enforce criminal laws or to protect other
fundamental rights of its citizens -justify an intrusion into a person's privacy.243
The Court, however, specifically rejected the argument that there was a compelling
describing the property sought and the place and purpose of the execution, but limiting the
seizure to only the property subject to execution in the writ); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21.120
(Michie 2002) (permitting the issuance of a writ of execution describing the specific details
of the judgment, and allowing the sheriff to enter onto the debtor's property to satisfy the
judgment and costs out of the debtor's real or personal property); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-2106 (2002) (permitting a writ of execution that "particularly describe[s] the property to be
delivered ...
[and] the value of the property," and allowing the sheriffto satisfy the judgment
out of the personal property of the debtor, or out of the real property of the debtor); VA.
CODE ANN.§§ 8.01-466,8.01-474, 8.01-491 (Michie 2002) (permitting a writ offierifacias
upon request of a judgment creditor, which commands the officer to "make the money" out
of the goods and chattels of the person against whom the judgment is rendered, even if it
means resorting to "break[ing] open the outer doors of [the debtor's] dwelling house" if the
officer's admittance is denied); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-119 (Michie 2002)
(affording the sheriff immunity from civil suits for his official actions performed in the

execution of these writs).
237 At least one federal court has suggested that an inventory of the contents of a home
performed pursuant to a writ of assistance will satisfy the Fourth Amendment's less stringent
requirement of reasonableness in civil searches, as long as the creditor submits an affidavit
in support of the writ of assistance and a judicial official reviews and approves the writ.
Owens v. Swan, 962 F. Supp. 1436, 1440 (D. Utah 1997).
238 966 P.2d 1121 (Mont. 1998).

Id. at
Id. at
241 Id. at
242 Id. at
243 Id.
239
240

1136.
1135.
1136-37.
1138.
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state interest that justified an intrusion into a person's privacy in this case because
the purpose of the search was to enforce a civil judgment between two private
2 44

citizens.

The federal government does not have a compelling interest in what is
essentially a dispute between private parties, i.e., the debtor and his creditors. Once
a trustee is appointed, the trustee has the right to title and possession of property of
the estate, and debtors statutorily are required to assist trustees.2 45 Notwithstanding
this, existing law does not justify giving trustees the right to search the home of a
debtor to find property (or documents related to that property) that the trustee may
use to pay creditor claims any more than it would justify giving a private plaintiff
the right to search a home to get documents or objects that could be used to support
its claim or pay any judgment subsequently rendered in the case.2 46 A trustee should
not be allowed to search a debtor's home to inventory property because private
parties could not do so in a pre-judgment attachment proceeding. In addition, the
trustee (like a private judgment creditor) at most should be entitled to conduct a
search only if the she specifies the property likely to be found.
D. Allowing Trustees to Search Homes Is Not Authorized by, or Consistent with,
Bankruptcy Laws
The Chapter 7 trustee is a "creature of statute and has only those powers
conferred thereby."24' 7 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(a) authorizes law
enforcement officials and government attorneys to obtain search warrants. No such
rule applies in civil litigation in the federal courts. The trustee in Barman was not
a law enforcement officer or a government attorney and did not appear to have been
trained to search debtors' homes.2 41 Indeed, the trustee appeared to understand one
244

Id.

245
246

See supra text accompanying notes 96-102, 111.
See id.

247

In re Benny, 29 B.R. 754, 760 (N.D. Cal. 1983).

Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403, 412 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
Though not all administrative searches are performed by trained law enforcement officers,
they are conducted by government employees who ostensibly were trained to perform the
search. See, e.g., United States v. Goff, 677 F. Supp. 1526, 1541 (D. Utah 1987) (discussing
a search in a bankruptcy fraud prosecution performed by an agent of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms who was trained in such inspections). The search in Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), was conducted by a municipal health inspector,
whereas the search in Wyman v. James,400 U.S. 309 (1971), was attempted bya caseworker
for Aid to Families with Dependent Children. That a warrant is executed outside the presence
of a law enforcement officer does not make the searchper se unreasonable. Indeed, in some
instances a civilian search may be more reasonable than a search by a law enforcement
officer, especially if the civilian has greater technical expertise in the matter in dispute. See
United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 2002) (permitting employees of an
24'
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of the primary practical benefits of having searches performed by law enforcement
officers when he asked the court to allow an armed Federal Marshall to accompany
him during the search. 49 Whereas panel trustees are given most of the powers
provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the bankruptcy rules do not
incorporate the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. As such, trustees have no
explicit statutory authority to request or execute a search warrant. Moreover,
whereas panel trustees are supervised by a federal agent, the OUST views panel
trustees as private parties, not government lawyers.
The Barman trustee should have had the right to cooperate with a criminal
investigation of an individual debtor just as the trustee in United States v. Patrick
had the right to assist the Inspector General's criminal investigation. 5 ' Likewise,
a panel trustee should - and, in fact, must - cooperate with a criminal bankruptcy
fraud investigation. However, the fact that a trustee should help facilitate a criminal
investigation does not mean that she can help conduct the investigation by searching
the debtor's home for property the debtor failed to disclose or relinquish. That is,
whereas trustees should be allowed to give the debtor's records to law enforcement
officials, they should not have the right to search the debtor's home to find those
records. This is especially true in light of the heightened privacy protections given
to the home and the fact that courts have permitted trustees to waive debtor's
constitutional rights only in cases involving corporate, not individual, debtors.2 '
Though the bankruptcy court has the authority to order debtors to both disclose
the existence of assets and deny a discharge to any debtor who fails to do so,
permitting trustees to search debtors' homes simply is not consistent with the
administrative scheme designed in the Bankruptcy Code. No federal statute
embodies a congressional determination that the public has an interest in forcing
debtors to repay all their debts. Instead, the federal Bankruptcy Code serves to
facilitate federal debt collection cases that either a debtor or its creditors have
initiated, and it permits debtors to discharge most debts in Chapter 7 liquidation
cases (and even more debts in Chapter 13 wage earner cases).252 Neither the
public's interest in having uniform bankruptcy laws nor the "demands of efficiency
and enforcement of the bankruptcy laws ' 25 3 outweigh a person's interest in
preventing the government - or a private attorney associated with the
Internet service provider to search an e-mail account outside the presence of a law
enforcement officer for evidence of child pornography).
249 Barman, 252 B.R. at 411.
250 916 F. Supp. 567 (N.D.W. Va. 1996).
251 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985)
(allowing trustee to waive a debtor-corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to prebankruptcy communications).
252 See 11 U.S.C. §523(a) (2000) (listing eighteen exceptions to discharge in Chapter 7);
see also 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2000) (listing five exceptions to discharge in Chapter 13).
253 In re Benny, 29 B.R. 754, 766 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
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from searching his home.

E. Allowing Searches Will Permit - If Not Encourage - PretextualSearches
The Barman opinion relied heavily on the fact that the trustee's inspection of
the debtor's home was "not for the purpose of discovering evidence of crime."254
Notwithstanding the civil nature of the search, the greatest concern raised by the
Barman court's decision to grant the inspection order is the risk that the holding
will encourage trustees to search a debtor's home in order to bolster a later criminal
bankruptcy fraud prosecution. Indeed, the court's reliance on the "civil," rather
than "criminal," nature of this dispute belied the fact that the elements required to
prove that a debtor fraudulently conveyed property are substantially the same ones
required to prove that the debtor engaged in criminal bankruptcy fraud.255
To establish that a debtor has fraudulently conveyed property, the trustee must
either rely on the state fraudulent transfer law (which generally requires a showing
that a debtor intentionally transferred property to hinder creditor collection
attempts, or transferred property for less than fair value)256 or section 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code (which requires the trustee to prove actual fraud or that the debtor
transferred property for less than the reasonably equivalent value and that the
transfer rendered him insolvent).257 The court can deny a debtor a discharge under
Chapter 7 if the party objecting to the discharge introduces evidence that the debtor:
(1) concealed, destroyed, or failed to keep financial records; (2) gave false
statements during the case; (3) failed to explain a loss of assets; or (4) withheld
records or property from the trustee.25 Given the similarity between the elements
required to prove that a debtor fraudulently conveyed property and that a debtor
committed bankruptcy fraud, fraudulent conveyance actions potentially subject the
debtor to criminal liability for knowingly or fraudulently concealing property ofthe
estate from the trustee or for making fraudulent statements about the bankruptcy
case.259 Indeed, the court in Barmanconceded that the trustee was required to give
the United States Trustee any evidence of crime, which the U.S. Trustee would then
*giveto the United States Attorney presumably for the U.S. Attorney to determine
whether the debtor should be criminally prosecuted.26 A criminal prosecution was
a real possibility in Barman (and probably a justifiable one), given the debtor's past
" ' Similarly, the results of the trustee's
behavior.26
search in this case could cause the
254

255
256

Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403, 417 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
See id. at 412-13,416.
See UNF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 266 (1985).

11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2000).
258 Id. § 727(a)(3), (5).
259 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 152(1)-(3), (7)-(9), 157(3) (2000).
257

260

Barman, 252 B.R. at 417.

261 Id. at 407-10.
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debtor's wife and parents to be prosecuted for knowingly and fraudulently receiving
property from the debtor post-petition if their intent was to help the debtor defeat
his obligations under the Bankruptcy Code.262
Bankruptcy fraud prosecutions are rare and generally will not be brought unless
the debtor has concealed a significant amount of property.2 63 Even if the risk of a
bankruptcy fraud prosecution is low, because the government has no compelling
interest in private debt collection disputes, and because allowing trustees to
rummage through a debtor's home encourages pretextual searches, courts should not
allow panel trustees to perform non-consensual home searches, absent clear
statutory authority.
F. Possible Solutions
1. Existing Remedies
A person who files for bankruptcy relief ordinarily does so to receive a
discharge of most debts and to keep exempt property. The Code contains penalties
for debtors who file a bankruptcy petition for improper reasons or who fail to
comply with the requirements imposed by the Code." For example, the court can
issue an order requiring the debtor to turn over non-exempt property or property the
debtor has improperly converted to exempt property if the evidence establishes the
existence of the property (or its proceeds).2 65 A debtor who refuses to comply with
a turn-over order may be held in contempt, fined, and incarcerated until he complies
2 66
with the order.
A debtor who intentionally hides estate property from the Trustee and then lies
about the existence of the property on bankruptcy forms or schedules or during an
examination under oath can be prosecuted for perjury.2 67 In addition, debtors who
refuse to turn over estate property or to disclose financial information can be
sanctioned by having the court refuse to grant a discharge.26 Without the benefit
262

See 18 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2000).

263

Craig Peyton Gaumer, A Call to Arms: How Can the Department of Justice Better

Combat Bankruptcy Crimes?, Am. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 1999, at 8.

11 U.S.C. § 110(2) (2000).
See Lawrence v. Chapter 7 Trustee (In re Lawrence), 251 B.R. 630, 639 (S.D. Fla.
2000) (ordering the turn over of res in an offshore trust settled by the Chapter 7 debtor
immediately before a $20.4 million arbitration award was entered against him).
266 See Lawrence v. Goldberg (In re Lawrence), 279 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11 th Cir. 2002).
267 18 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000).
268 If a trustee has enough proof to convince a court to issue a search warrant, the trustee
certainly should have enough proof to convince the court to deny the debtor a discharge,
which is exactly what the trustee did in Solomon v. Barman (In re Barman), 244 B.R. 896
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000). Given the debtor's failure to keep records and apparent loss of
26'

265
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of a discharge, an individual debtor remains liable for all debts.269 Moreover, in
Chapter 7 cases involving primarily consumer debts, trustees can move to dismiss
the case for substantial abuse.2 70 A debtor who consistently refuses to disclose
assets or cannot satisfactorily explain the disappearance of those assets could be
viewed as substantially abusing the bankruptcy process. Finally, any case involving
a debtor who appears to have engaged in fraudulent conduct when hiding assets
could (and should) be referred to the U.S. Trustee or U.S. Attorney for a bankruptcy
71
fraud investigation.
2. Potential Remedies
Though debtors have a diminished expectation of privacy in the financial
information they disclose in their bankruptcy schedules, as discussed earlier,272 none
of the rules applicable to bankruptcy cases give debtors notice that filing for
bankruptcy grants a private attorney the authority to enter and search their homes.
If there is a legitimate governmental interest in ensuring that debtors comply with
the Bankruptcy Code and Rules,273 then Congress should revise either the
Bankruptcy Code or Rules to provide that one of the debtor's duties is to consent
to a search of their homes. Debtors currently are required to provide information
about their assets on the schedules they submit with their bankruptcy petitions.
Because debtors are required to disclose everything they own - whether large or
small, personal or not - trustees may already feel as if they are probing into the
intimacies of debtors' lives when they review debtors' bankruptcy petitions and
schedules. No matter the level of detail that debtors are required to disclose on
paper, however, there simply is a difference between the feeling that you are
rummaging through a person's lingerie drawer and actually being allowed to
physically rummage through those drawers. In addition to requiring that they
declare under penalty of perjury that they have read the schedules and affirm that
they are true and correct, debtors could be required to affirm that they understand
that submitting the bankruptcy petition and schedules subjects them to a search of
assets, the court denied the discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3) and (a)(5).
269 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (2000).
270 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000).
271 See 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2000).
272 See supra text accompanying notes 186-89.
273 Even ifthere is a legitimate governmental interest in ensuring compliance with federal
law, it is unclear whether there is sufficient abuse of the bankruptcy process to warrant such
an intrusion into the lives of each person who files a bankruptcy petition. That is, while Mr.
Barman clearly appeared to have abused the protections provided by the Bankruptcy Code
and there are other debtors who have committed similar abuses, it is hard to determine
whether this is a case that confirms the adage that "bad facts make bad law" or whether there
is a genuine need to increase the Trustee's existing powers to respond to debtor abuse.
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their homes. Likewise, in addition to informing debtors that they can be fined up
to $500,000 or imprisoned for up to five years under the bankruptcy fraud statute
if they intentionally provide inaccurate information, debtors also could be told at
the beginning of the process that their homes may be searched if the trustee suspects
that they have hidden assets.
A second remedy would be for Congress to revise the dischargeability
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to make the debtor's consent to a residential
search a condition of discharge, thereby placing debtors on notice of the possibility
that their homes may be searched. Debtors who desire to discharge their debts
would file their petitions knowing that they will not be granted a discharge unless
74
they consent to the search of their homes.

Third, Congress could give bankruptcy courts the explicit authority to issue
administrative search warrants. Again, this would make clear that there is a public
interest in ensuring that debtors fully disclose their assets to the trustees and would,
again, place the debtor on notice of the possibility of having her home searched.
The Code also would need to clarify that searching (or supervising a search of)
debtors' homes is one of the trustee's duties. Trustees either should be given the
authority to perform the searches themselves2 75 or should be allowed to request that
law enforcement officials conduct the search. If a trustee is concerned about her
safety such that she feels the need to request the presence of a law enforcement
officer, or feels unqualified to search a debtor's home, courts should require a law
enforcement officer to perform the search in the presence of the trustee.
CONCLUSION

The Barmancourt held that the trustee's obligation to "marshal and account for
all property of the estate" outweighed the debtor's Fourth Amendment expectation
of privacy in his home.276 However, the court failed to adequately consider
established Fourth Amendment precedent when it allowed a private party to
I realize that proposing that all debtors "consent" to waiving their right to privacy in
their homes may, to some, appear both to be a stretch to the concept of "consent" (unless one
assumes the validity ofcoerced consent) and unnecessary (especially ifone assumes that only
a small percentage of debtors abuse the bankruptcy process by hiding assets). However,
courts consistently hold that a discharge in bankruptcy is a privilege, not a right, that should
inure only to the benefit of honest debtors. See In re Juzwiak, 89 F.3d 424, 427 (7th Cir.
1996) (citing cases). Thus, assuming Congress imposed by the Code, requiring debtor
consent would at least alert debtors of the possibility that a private attorney might come into
their homes to search for estate property and would give them the opportunity to choose not
to take advantage of the "privilege" of the discharge.
275 If Congress gives trustees the authority to search the homes of individuals, however,
the OUST would need to provide some type of training for the trustees.
276 Taunt v. Barman (In re Barman), 252 B.R. 403,416-18 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
274
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perform a general, non-consensual search of the debtor's home in a non-criminal
bankruptcy proceeding. Specifically, Barman noted the intrusive nature of allowing
a trustee to search a debtor's home, yet failed to accommodate the extremely
protected status afforded to the home under Fourth Amendment precedent.277
Barman's balancing of interests put too much emphasis on the trustee's need to
investigate the debtor's property and far too little emphasis on the privacy interests
the debtor had in his home.2 78 Moreover, the broad search the court authorized in
Barman seems unwarranted, since the trustee had more than ample cause to ask the
court to deny the debtor a discharge (thus obviating the need to recover property of
the estate) or to refer the case for a possible bankruptcy fraud prosecution (where
a search of the home would have been appropriate).279
Searches in bankruptcy cases are especially problematic and should be viewed
as presumably unreasonable because (1) the Bankruptcy Code does not require
debtors to consent to searches of their residences, (2) nothing in either the
Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Rules, or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which
generally are incorporated in bankruptcy proceedings) place debtors on notice that
their homes are subject to search, and (3) none of the rules applicable to noncriminal bankruptcy cases authorize trustees to either request or execute a search
warrant. Requiring debtors to consent to a search of their homes as a condition of
filing a bankruptcy petition, or giving trustees the authority to search the debtor's
home, would make the rules applicable in bankruptcy law cases similar to state and
federal statutes that give notice to those in closely regulated businesses that
governmental officials have the right to search their businesses. Moreover, forcing
debtors to consent to a search would clarify that debtors in bankruptcy proceedings
- like probationers or other persons subject to federal regulations - have a
diminished expectation of privacy both in their businesses and their homes.
The debtor in Barman was not a saint. Far from it. Indeed, like many of the
criminal defendants in court cases that have found constitutional violations, the
debtor most likely did everything the trustee accused him of doing. But that is not
the point. Debtors - even those who hide assets from their creditors - retain
basic constitutional protections, including a reasonable expectation that their homes
will not be searched by anyone other than law enforcement officers or officers
entrusted to protect a legitimate governmental interest.
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See id. at411-12.
See id. at417-18.
See id. at 419-20.

